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Decentralization  and Fiscal Management  in Colombia
Colombia is  a  nation  of  sharp contrasts. The  country is  geographically fragmented by
physical characteristics and  guerrilla war, yet it has  a long tradition of political centralism and
macroeconomic stability. Recently it has experienced political and economic decentralization and
also  some  weakening  of  macroeconomic performance.  This  paper  explores  the  institutional
arrangements  that have helped Colombia to manage the fiscal aspects of decentralization, despite its
political problems.
Fiscal decentralization has proceeded rapidly in Colombia because political democratization
of municipalities and then departments began at a time when substantial expenditures already had
been delegated to the previously appointed mayors and governors. The decentralization has led to
substantial but not overwhelming problems, both in maintaining fiscal balance at the national level,
as resources are transferred to subnational levels, and in preventing unsustainable deficits by the
subnational governments.  The problems have arisen because  national government  interference
prevents departments from controlling their costs and because subnational governments have come
to expect debt bailouts. Both of these are legacies of the earlier pattern of management from the
center, and some recent changes, particularly in the area of subnational debt, may improve matters.
The regular political process has not been dealing with the problems of decentralization, because
traditional parties have weak internal organizations and illegal parties exercise de facto rule over
substantial territories.  The  fiscal  problems of  subnational  governments have  been  contained,
however, because these governments are relatively weak politically, and some key control functions
are regulated  by  law  or  are  delegated to  national  agencies.  Fiscal  problems of  the  national
government are mostly its own doing.
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Since 1986, Colombia has been decentralizing its democracy and public finances, joining
Argentina and Brazil in the ranks of Latin American countries with highly decentralized public
sectors. In Colombia, political decentralization, in the sense of elected mayors in  1986 and then
governors in 1991, came after spending had been substantially delegated to the local levels, starting
in 1968. In contrast to Argentina and Brazil, Colombia implemented decentralization long after the
transition from military to civilian rule and without the complication of hyperinflation. Indeed, on
the  one  hand,  Colombia  has  enjoyed  a  tradition  and  reputation  for  sound  macroeconomic
management, which was associated in some minds with  central fiscal control or with  centrally
controlled fiscal deconcentration in the early 1980s. In the 1990s, on the other hand, the expansion
of political and fiscal decentralization coincided  with the expansion of fiscal deficits and a failure to
share in the general increase in macroeconomic  stability in most other parts of Latin America.
This paper analyzes the institutional features of fiscal decentralization in Colombia and its
effects on macroeconomic stability. The paper identifies a number of weaknesses in Colombia's
decentralization but  finds  that  decentralization has  not  been  the  main  cause  of  the  nation's
macroeconomic problems.  The  institutions  for  decentralization  and  overall  macroeconomic
management have prevented  Colombia's serious political problems-guerrilla  war and corruption
from drug money-from  causing even greater problems for economic policy and have mitigated the
fiscal problems that have arisen in other countries from the decentralization process. Of course,
fiscal stability is not the only  measure of success for decentralization, and the extent or form of
decentralization  to date has not been adequate to solve Colombia's political problems.
3Colombia is a unitary  state, so the departments and  municipalities have less autonomous
status than Brazilian states or Argentine provinces, but the constitution and the electoral process
confer substantial political legitimacy on them. Another distinguishing feature are the two or three
decades of guerrilla war that have conferred de facto, but not constitutional, autonomous status on
large areas of the country. This partially motivated the decentralization process in the 1980s, as the
national  government  sought  to  strengthen  the  legitimacy of  formal  governrnent. The  fragile
legitimacy of the subnational governments (SNGs) facing guerrilla threats also limits their scope for
politically feasible fiscal adjustment.'
Despite  several  differences,  Colombia  has  faced the  same  basic  challenges with  fiscal
management as  Argentina  and  Brazil.  One  of the main  dangers  in  this  area is  that  national
government  will  incur  excess  fiscal  deficits  as  it  transfers  its  revenue  base  to  subnational
governments but has difficulty reducing expenditure in equal measure. The other main risk is that
the combination of democratic rule and the expectation of bailouts  from the center could lead
subnational governments to run excessive deficits, upsetting the overall balance of the public sector
and eventually the fiscal balance of the national government itself. Argentina and Brazil have faced
these dangers over the past  15 years and often succumbed to them. In the 1990s both countries
struggled against these tendencies, Argentina with considerable success (Dillinger and Webb 1998).
Because of differences in their institutions and history, Colombia's  outcomes have differed thus far
from those of its larger neighbors, but some of the problems and the options in Colombia today are
like those in Brazil and five to fifteen years ago in Argentina, when subnational fiscal imbalances
caused problems at the national level.
The  central  and  subnational  govemment  deficits  are  the  key  manifestations  of
macroeconomic problems. The outcomes depend on the combination of fiscal and political rules for
This is not to say that local govemments  in guerrilla-controlled  areas have not been fiscally prudent, for
4intergovermnental relations.  As  background  to  the  discussion  of  these  rules  and  their  fiscal
outcomes in the 1990s, we start with a chronological overview.
I. Historical Overview
Colombia embarked on political decentralization more recently than Brazil and Argentina.
Although the country has a  long history  of civilian rule and  regional diversity, the government
became increasingly centralized beginning with the 1886 constitution and up until the late 1970s.
By then, the national government raised more than 80 percent of the revenue, as opposed to about
60 percent in  the first half of the  century (Bird  1984; Sanchez and  Gutierrez  1995). The first
indications  of  national interest  in  decentralization appeared  in  the  1968  constitution, which
established a  regional fund for education and health to be financed  from a  fixed percentage of
national revenues. Because the national government appointed governors, who appointed mayors,
this  represented  less  a  decentralization  than  a  deconcentration of  the  budget  to  subnational
administrative units-32  departments, 4 districts (municipalities with the status of departnents),
and 1,070  municipalities. In addition, municipalities were assigned 10 percent of the then-new value
added tax (IVA). Further steps toward fiscal decentralization were  made in  1983 with laws that
strengthened the tax authority of departrnents and municipalities. The design of this decentralization
drew heavily on a report by a panel of international experts (reprinted  as Bird 1984). Although
Colombia  remained politically centralized in  the  sense that  elections  were  held  only  for  the
president and Congress,  the politicians for a locality-senators  and deputies-had  a lot of say in the
selection of governors and mayors.
Political decentralization in the law began in 1986, with Law 78/86 removing the power of
departmental governors to appoint mayors. The first mayoral elections took place in 1988. Over the
indeed they have typically shown fiscal restraint, perhaps in part because they do not have much access  to credit.
5next three years, the government enacted sweeping legislation aimed at transferring many public
service  responsibilities to  the newly  elected mayors  and providing them  with  additional fiscal
resources  (Laws  12/86,  24/88,  and  29/89;  Decree  24/88).  This  legislation  largely  bypassed
departments, leaving them mainly supervisory or coordinating roles. Some municipalities developed
the capacity to manage the new responsibilities, demonstrating  that it could be done (Fiszbein 1997;
World Bank  1995). But many did not develop the capacity, at least not quickly, which motivated
government to shift to a more deliberate, step-by-step process.
A restructuring of decentralization  arrangements in 1991 granted more political autonomy and
service responsibilities to the departments and made the fiscal authority of both departments and
municipalities  conditional  on  a  certification  process  (Ahmad  and  Baer  1997;  Ferreira  and
Valenzuela 1993; Sdnchez and Gutierrez 1995; Wiesner Duran 1992). The new  1991 constitution
established the direct election of governors. Subsequent implementing legislation (Law 60) partially
reversed the functional decentralization of social services to municipalities. For municipalities, the
revisions during the early 1990s  represented a loss of management autonomy but a gain in transfer
revenues.  The  1991-94  reforms  also  reduced  the  national  governnent's  discretion  in  the
distribution of transfers. The increased transfers and the assignment of oil royalties gave subnational
entities about half of public sector current revenues. The degree of true fiscal decentralization was
less than it appears in the accounts, however, because the national government decided how the
departments and to some extent the municipalities would have to use their main transfers.
The national executive and congressmen each had different motives for decentralization but
eventually reached a pragmatic agreement on action. Presidents from  both parties, starting in the
early 1980s, saw decentralization as a way to help rebuild the shattered legitimacy of the formal
state. In 1991 a constitutional convention, mandated by a referendum called by the president using
emergency  powers,  wrote  a  new  constitution establishing  decentralization.  The nontraditional
parties, representing interests long excluded from national power, had the majority of delegates and
6used the opportunity to pass power and resources to the subnational levels where they held some of
the  executive  offices.  Also,  the  Liberal Party,  which  had  favored  decentralization since the
nineteenth century, had a plurality of delegates-about  one-third-many  more than the traditionally
centrist  Conservative  party (Buenahora  1997). Congress decided  to  live  with  decentralization
because it gave local administrations the power to execute spending, and these local entities were
usually allied with their congressmen, acting as their machines in many cases (Archer and Shugart
1997; Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1997).
Table  1.  Growth,  Inflation,  and  Fiscal  Balances  in Colombia,  1987-97
(percent)
Indicator  1987-90  1991-94  1995-97a
Real  growth  (annual  average)  4.5  4.3  3.5
Inflation  (annual  average)  15  9  7
Overall  fiscal  balance  as  a percentage  of  GDP
Central  -1.0  -1.1  -4.2
Department  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2
Municipal  -0.1  -0.3  -0  .1
Primary  balance  as a percentage  of GDP
Central  0.1  0.3  -2.2
Departrnent  -0.1  -0.1  0.1
Municipal  0.0  0.0  0.2
a. 1995  only  for  department  and  municipal  balances.
Sources:  World  Bank  database;  Central  Bank  of Colombia,  table  4.
As  the system operated in the late  1990s, strengths emerged, such  as  increased political
participation, and  so  did  weaknesses,  such  as  mismatched  spending  authority  and  excessive
borrowing by some subnational units. Overall, however, the fiscal deterioration occurred mostly at
the national level. See table 1.
II. Explanatory Variables
Because the  Colombian experience with political  and fiscal decentralization is relatively
short and an economic crisis has not yet tested the system, we evaluate the system on dimensions
that have proven critical in Argentina and Brazil for determining whether subnational govermments
contribute to unsustainable overall public sector deficits. The explanatory variables fall into two
7main groups: fiscal institutions and intergovemmental political relations. In each area we identify as
hypotheses the conditions we would expect to lessen the likelihood that fiscal decentralization will
lead to excessive deficits. It is rare for a country to meet all of the conditions, but severe problems
arise if too few of the  conditions are met. The challenge of this research is  to discover which
combinations are adequate to prevent fiscal decentralization from leading to unsustainable fiscal
deficits and which are not.
Fiscal institutions
For fiscal institutions,  the key questions concern the  division of authority in three  areas:
revenues, spending, and borrowing. What authority do SNGs have to raise revenue and control their
spending? What authority does the national government have to shift spending responsibilities to
the subnational governments and to reduce the transfer of resources in order to balance the national
government budget? What budget constraints do SNGs face, and how are they set? Under what
conditions can SNGs issue debt?
Revenue autonomy. With fiscal decentralization, the SNGs usually receive certain tax bases,
but for various reasons-politics,  equity, and efficiency-these  tax bases rarely cover all of their
expenses. Thus SNGs also receive some federal transfers. One view is that subnational governments
have smaller deficits if they rely more on their own tax bases (and have the power to change tax
rates on the margin) because they can adjust to shocks by increasing revenue. Also, relying on one's
own resources may strengthen the incentives -to control  spending, and of course  it reduces the
burden on national government. Thus unsustainable overall  public sector deficits  are less  likely
under condition 1, subnational governments raise much of their own revenue. Furthermore, given
that there are transfers from the center to the subnational governments, unsustainable deficits would
be less likely to be problematic under condition 2, transfers are specified by legal formula,  not ad
hoc.
8In  Colombia, decentralization  grew  out  of  the  deconcentration  of  national  revenues to
subnational administrative units.  As  in Argentina and  Brazil,  revenue  sharing set by  formula
accounts for most of the transfers.  The critical question was flexibility at the margin.  Starting in
1968 a departmental  fund for education and health was financed from a fixed percentage of national
revenues, and  municipalities were  assigned  10 percent  of  the then-new  IVA, which  was  not
earrnarked. This was designed to solve the problem of ad hoc transfers to supplement inadequate
sources of local revenue. Even after 1968 ad hoc transfers remained a problem, as mayors continued
to ask the president for help to meet the cost of their new responsibilities. A major review of the
system of intergovernmental transfers hardened the SNGs' budget constraint vis-a-vis the national
government and strengthened their own revenue sources (Bird 1984). A 1983 law standardized the
departmental taxes on liquor and cigarettes and ceded the national tax on vehicles to territorial
governments. It also authorized a revaluation of the municipal property tax and permitted some
local discretion over tax rates. Although it may seem unimportant that earmarked revenues were
deconcentrated  to subnational authorities appointed by the national government, congressmen at the
head of local political machines actually controlled these funds and appointments.
The 1991 constitution (which also made the office of governor an elected post) and Law 60
of 1993 moderately expanded the amount of revenues assigned to departments by broadening the
base of the existing revenue-sharing system (the situado fiscal) to include all recurrent revenues of
the govermment:  the value added tax, customs, income tax, and special funds. 2 They mandated a
steady increase in the share of these revenues to be transferred to the departments. The share of the
situado increased from 22.1 percent in 1993-net  of one-time adjustments-to  23 percent in 1994,
23.5  percent  in  1995, and  24.5  percent  in  1996.  Thereafter,  the  constitution committed  the
government to increasing the share sufficiently "to  permit adequate provision of the services for
2 Revenues from special funds were excluded.
9which  it is intended." The sharing formula was to be revised by Congress every five years. For
municipalities, the  1991 constitution broadened the base of the existing revenue-sharing system
from  the  IVA to  all  government current revenues and committed  the  national government to
increase the municipal share from 14 percent in 1993 to a minimum of 22 percent by 2002. Thus the
1991 constitution and Law 60 committed the national government to sharing nearly half of all its
current revenues with territorial govermments and entities by 2002. (The proportion in 1998 was
already 42.5 percent.)
The 1991-94 reforms also reduced the national government's  discretion in the distribution
of transfers. Prior to Law 60, the situado was paid directly to teachers and health workers under the
ministries of education and health. Law 60 changed this system to one in which the situado was
transferred directly to each departnental  government on the basis of a formula. 3
The distribution of revenue sharing among municipalities-the  participaciones municipales and the
share of the value added tax-was  also formula driven: 60 percent was to be distributed in
proportion to the number of habitants with unsatisfied basic needs and relative level of poverty (as
determined by the Central Statistical Agency), with the remaining 40 percent distributed according
to population, administrative efficiency, and improvements in quality of life (all quantitatively
defined in legislation). As a transition measure in 1994-98, each municipality received, as a
minimum, the amount of IVA transferred in 1992, in constant prices. Also Law 60 specified that
part of the transfer would be distributed equally to all municipalities, which meant that small
municipalities got much more per capita and that there was a lot of incentive to form new (small)
municipalities. The latter happened a lot at first, as in Brazil and Mexico, but then the problem was
brought under some control by the rules for certification of municipalities.  Even though this sort of
3 According to Law 60, 15 percent of the situado  is to be uniformly distributed to each department and district.
The distribution of the remaining 85 percent  is to be  based on a formula taking  into account the current number of
students  enrolled,  the number  of school-age  children  not attending  school,  the number  of patients  seen  by health units,
and the number of potential patients based on population.
10arrangement is not a immediate  danger to overall fiscal balance, since the amount of money
distributed stays fixed, it contributed to inefficient expansion of the total public sector.
Cofinancing funds, derived from a national government program for rural development in
the 1970s, have evolved into a program of transfers to municipalities for capital investment needs-
intermunicipal  roads,  municipal  roads,  social  investment  (mainly  education),  and  rural
infrastructure. The investment funding is important because it provides flexibility in usage, whereas
most of the other transfers are earmarked for specific and relatively inflexible current expenses,
mainly wages. In principle, they are distributed by a formula similar to that for other transfers-per
capita plus the number of persons with unsatisfied basic needs and the local fiscal effort. In practice,
at least until 1997, there was no coordination among the four main funds (one for each of the areas
listed), and there was considerable political discretion in the allocation of projects, which became
important channels for patronage. The total amounts were not fixed as a percentage of total tax
revenues, like the other transfers, but rather were a budget item. Up to the mid-1990s they grew in
importance, reaching 40 percent of total transfers to municipalities. Since then, they have declined
somewhat, due to fiscal pressure on the national budget. In 1997 a reform unified the fimds, and
converted  most  of  them  into  soft  loans  managed  by  FINDETER,  a  government  financial
intermediary (Ahmad and Baer 1997; Rojas  1997).  The reform improved the coordination and
transparency of the investment funds, but along with discretionary transfers  for universities, they
remain important loopholes in the hard budget constraint for states.
In addition, some taxes are under the control of subnational governments. A few SNGs
receive  royalties from  mineral production,  which go mostly to the  producer  departments (47.5
percent), producer municipalities (12.5 percent), and port municipalities (8 percent). These units
receive a large amount of resources. Less than one-third-32  percent-of  the royalties go into a
fund that is redistributed across the country; no royalties go to the federal government (Sanchez and
Gutierrez  1995). This innovation in the  1990s may have been aimed at strengthening the han-d  of
11local governments facing guerrilla threats, which often targeted oil production, but this rationale
does not seem to have been explicit. 4 Most departments have only the tax on alcohol, cigarettes,
and lotteries. Municipal governments have a broader range of small excise taxes and property tax.
The most important revenue sources for subnational govermments  are the tax on alcoholic beverages
by the departments and the tax on gross turnover of business and on property by the municipalities
(Ahmad and Baer 1997; Bird and Fiszbein 1998).
In summary then, Colombia does not meet condition 1, since subnational govermrents do
not raise most of their own revenue. Most transfers are through revenue sharing by formula, in line
with condition 2, but there are important exceptions.
Expenditure  autononty. Without  SNGs having autonomy over their  expenditure, there is
really no  fiscal decentralization and no macro-fiscal problem likely to  come of it.  Subnational
spending autonomy  is, of  course, the way in  which decentralization would have the  expected
benefits of increased efficiency in matching the needs and desires of a diverse population. In terms
of the effects on macro-fiscal management, two aspects are usually important. One is whether the
central government can dictate which functions the subnational govermnents must take on, at least
in exchange for receiving transfers from the center. Where the central govermment  can do this, it
helps contain central spending and deficits. Where it cannot, as in Brazil, the central government
may find itself with  a constitutional obligation and political expectation that  it will continue to
provide  some  service  even after it  begins  tuming  over  revenues or  tax  bases  to  subnational
governments with the understanding that they will do the task. The other issue is whether SNGs
have authority to cut costs, particularly to cut personnel, salaries, and pension benefits, which are
4Perry and Rodriguez  (1991,  p. 77) note  that  this allocation  goes against  standard  practice  in the literature  and
that the reasons were "mas bien de indole  pragmatica  y, si se quiere, politica."  ("largely pragmatic  and perhaps
political").
12typically the  largest single  item of  subnational expenditure. Where  central rules  constrain this
ability, it is more difficult to reduce deficits and expectations of a central government bailout are
higher. Thus unsustainable deficits should be less likely under condition 3, the central government
can effectively delegate functions  to subnational governments to go along with the delegation of
revenue sources, and condition 4, subnational governments have authority to cut their costs.
In  Colombia  in  1986,  municipalities were  assigned  responsibility  for  constructing  and
maintaining schools and  for administering the teaching staff assigned (and paid) by the national
government. In  the  health  sector, municipalities were  made  responsible for  constructing  and
maintaining health care facilities. Municipalities were assigned responsibility for providing water
and  sewerage services  and  for constructing and  maintaining  local  roads  and  urban  transport
facilities. To finance  these expanded responsibilities, Law  12/86 committed the  government to
increasing municipality's  share  of the IVA from  50 percent  (by 1992). Corresponding national
agencies were to be abolished. These included the Colombian Institute for School Construction, the
National Institute for Municipal Development, INSFOPAL (which was responsible for water and
sewerage), and urban development companies, which were  responsible for the construction and
maintenance of urban roads, management of urban transport, and provision of low-income housing.
The situado fiscal  always provided most of the departments' revenue, as the law gave them
little scope to raise their own revenues: 60 percent of the situado was to be spent on education, 20
percent on health, and the remaining 20 percent on either sector. With the situado, departments
must pay teachers and health workers, whose salaries are set in negotiations between the national
government and the unions and whom the departments are effectively prohibited from dismissing.
In theory since 1995 the departments have had discretion within the  sector as to how to use the
situado fiscal  once the  salaries have been paid, but such surpluses have been rare thus  far. The
national government's authority to negotiate teachers'  salaries directly with the national teachers
union has already provoked a funding crisis in the sector. In 1996 the government conceded an 8
13percent real increase in salaries over three years. As the resulting wages exceeded the amount of the
situado assigned for education in many departments, the government was forced to establish the
Special Compensation Fund to finance the gap between the situado and the actual costs of teachers'
salaries.
For the municipalities, revenue sharing was also earmarked, but less strictly: 30 percent was
to be spent on basic education (infrastructure, equipment, or personnel), 25 percent on health, 20
percent on water supply (except in municipalities that had already achieved 70 percent coverage), 5
percent on physical education, and the remaining 20 percent on housing, welfare, debt service, and
other functions. Given the  latitude for interpreting these terms, the earmarking of MUNICIPAL
TRANSFERS has not been restrictive in practice.
Some of the assignment of functions depends on the establishment of adequate management
capacity. Legislation in  1993 (Law 60) reversed the earlier decentralization of social services to
municipalities. 5 In education, it  reassigned responsibility for managing  secondary and  primary
schools to  the departments, except  for  (larger) municipalities that  met  established criteria for
financial  and  managerial  competency.  In  health,  decentralization  was  included with  ongoing
reforms in  the structure of public sector health provision. These measures aimed to shift public
health spending from the so-called supply side-direct  funding of public health care facilities-to
the demand side, in the form of subsidies for national insurance. Some uncertainty remained in the
allocation of  responsibilities between the  state health  schemes and  the national social security
system (Bird and Fiszbein 1996). In implementing this program, territorial governments were to
transform their existing facilities  into public corporations, which would  finance themselves by
5Due  to its political  composition,  the constituent  assembly  that wrote  the 1991  constitution  could  not provide
for differential  treatment  of municipalities  or departments  according to their size and capacity,  even though the
differences are great. This had to be done later by law (Perry and Rodriguez 1991).
14charging the insured a fee for service. During the transition, each level  of  govemrnent was to
continue subsidizing its own facilities.
To assume the administration of education and health under the terms provided by Law 60,
each department and district was required to receive accreditation by the respective ministry of
education or health. In principle, accreditation required (1) a functional information system, (2) the
adoption of a development plan for each sector, (3) the approval by the departmental assembly of
the rules and procedures for the distribution of funding, (4) the adoption of a plan for coverage, and
(5)  agreement  with  the  respective ministry  on  institutional arrangements.  These institutional
arrangements delineated which dependency of the department would  take responsibility for the
service,  how  the  assets  would  be  transferred,  and  how personnel  would  be  structured and
administered.  Once  accredited, departments were  to  receive, within  four  years, the  assets and
personnel  that  would  "permit  them  to  comply  with the  functions  and  obligations they  have
assumed." In the absence of accreditation, these services were to continue being provided directly
by the national government. (The  law also  established that departments could, after they were
accredited and at the discretion of their legislative assemblies, firther  decentralize education to the
municipal level, subject to an accreditation process.)  Initially only the departments of Valle del
Cauca (Cali) and Antioquia (Medellin) were  fully certified, and a  few others were certified for
health services only. In the mid-1990s, the number expanded  to include most of the departments and
all the large cities.
Once accredited, departments still remained subject to national-government control over key
management issues. The law prohibited any territorial government from hiring teachers without
meeting the requirements of the estatuto docente. Departments were  required to incorporate the
terms of employment of all existing government or nationalized staff. 6 Existing departmental or
6 Departmental or municipal teachers who were transferred to the national government prior to Law 60.
15municipal staff had to be brought into the national payment structure for teachers. Most important,
all future remuneration and salary scales had to conform to national legislation, set in negotiations
between the national government and the national union.
After  several  adjustments to  the  rules,  which  themselves  create  some  uncertainty, the
spending assignment in  Colombia largely meets condition 3, in  that revenue decentralization is
accompanied by clear assignment of responsibilities, especially to departments, and the national
government  is  not  left  with  any  major  unfinded  responsibilities  for  service  delivery.  For
municipalities the  assignment of functions is  less  clear, but the requirement  of  demonstrating
administrative capacity also  serves as  a check.  From a  deeper perspective,  the prevalence of
earmarking and sometimes mandating expenditure even without a corresponding transfer reduces
the political value of good fiscal management by subnational government (because the unfunded
mandates already claim their marginal resources some times.)  Condition 4, freedom to cut costs,
has not been met, at least for departments. Furthermore, the Special Compensation Fund to offset
this problem overrides the automatic fonnula for transfers and thus partially violates condition 2.
Borrowing constraints. Although tax and spending policies create fiscal pressures, whether
they cause problems for macro-fiscal management depends on whether the SNGs face hard budget
constraints, limiting their  borrowing. A hard  budget constraint is universally  recommended as
essential for getting proper fiscal behavior (Tanzi 1995; Ter-Minassian 1997; IDB 1997; Weingast
1995; Wildasin 1997). Some borrowing may be sustainable and good for development, and many
national governments, such as that of Brazil, try  to control SNG borrowing (Ter-Minassian and
Craig 1997). Unsustainable deficits would be  less likely under condition 5, central government
strictly controls subnational borrowing ex ante. But how to achieve this in practice is not always
clear  when  the  subnational  governments  have  considerable political  autonomy.  Pseudo-strict
controls could make matters worse, if  central govermnent approval creates  the  impression and
16perhaps a self-fulfilling expectation that the central government has also made a guarantee (Bird
and Fiszbein 1996).
To run deficits, a subnational government must find a source of financing, which potentially
includes contractual borrowing from private domestic or foreign banks, issuance of domestic or
foreign bonds, and running up of arrears to suppliers and personnel.7 A creditor and the subnational
government would only agree to finance unsustainable deficits if both sides expected to gain, most
likely though some sort of federal bailout. The bailout could take many forms, including allowing
the financial system (implicitly insured by the government) to count as an asset debt that is not
being serviced. So unsustainable  deficits would  also  be  less  likely under  condition  6,  central
government credibly  commits  not  to  have  bailouts, prohibiting  explicit  bailouts  and forcing
subnational governments to service their debts, and under condition 7, regulators  force creditors to
accept the losses implied by any failure to service debt.  There is understandable ambivalence about
the incentive effects of  deductions from transfers to  force subnational governments to pay debt
service. In Argentina they have worked to enforce a hard budget constraint because the national
government has not filled the gap with extra transfers when provinces found themselves unable to
meet expenses after the deduction of debt service (Dillinger and Webb 1998).  In Mexico, on the
other hand, the federal govermment  has repeatedly given extraordinary transfers to over-indebted
states when debt service became burdensome and the automatic transfers has been a route through
which the responsibility has been traced back to the federal level.  In one case they reduced the
moral hazard, in the other they increased it. The policy on transfers made the difference.
It is also still an open question whether ex ante regulation or ex post enforcement of debt
service is more effective in preventing excessive SNG borrowing. The comparison of Argentina's
experience with ex post enforcement and Brazil's experience with ex ante regulation suggests that
17the  former approach works  better,  but  of  course the two  are not  mutually exclusive and  can
reinforce each other (Dillinger and Webb 1998). The administrative details may matter as much as
the legal principles, because the former determine who starts bearing the cost immediately when
there is some problem with payments. The effectiveness of the ultimate legal remedies depends in
part on whether they are anticipated by, or are contradictory to, the initial allocation of burdens.
In Colombia the controls on subnational borrowing have varied over time. In the 1980s and
before, all subnational borrowing had to be approved by the Ministry of Finance, and such approval
was the exception. This was natural, since the subnational entities were appointed representatives by
the national government and had  no political or fiscal autonomy. The ad hoc  approval process
gradually allowed more freedom for  domestic borrowing in  the  late  1980s and  1990s, as the
political and fiscal autonomy of subnational governments increased. (For external borrowing the
control was strict.) There was no effective ex ante control of cash advances from banks. In 1997 the
so-called Ley de Semaforos (the traffic-light law) brought into effect a rating system for territorial
governmnents,  based on the ratio of interest to operational savings and debt to current revenues
(Perry and Huertas. 1997).° The effectiveness of this law was questionable at first.  As shown in
table 2, the rating system  allowed  a fairly high degree of leveraging  of revenues.  Territorial
governments could receive a "green" rating even with 40 percent of so-called operational savings
allocated  to  interest  payments.  Moreover,  because  some  recurrent  costs  for  human  capital
development are counted as investment and saving, operational saving can be considerably larger
than the current account surplus, which is a more conventional measure of public sector saving and
creditworthiness.
7 Borrowing  from state-owned  banks  was a problem  in Argentina  and Brazil,  but the subnational  governments
in Colombia do not own banks.
8  Operational  savings  are defined as  current income (including local taxes, charges, receipts from
intergovernmental transfers, and  budget surpluses from the previous  year) less current  spending on personnel (but
excluding other  recurrent operating costs and interest). Interest includes interest on existing debt and the proposed loan.
18Table 2. Traffic-Light Rating System
Criteria  Rating  Consequence
Interest  as a percentage  of operational  savings  Green  No restrictions  on lending
less  than 40 percent
Interest  as a percentage  of operational  savings  Yellow  Lending  only  with approval  of Ministry
greater  than  or equal  to  40 percent  but less  of Finance,  after review  of debt  service
than 60 percent  projections
Interest  as a percentage  of operational  savings  Red  No lending,  unless  the territorial
greater  than  60 percent  or debt stock  as a  government  agrees  to adjustment  plan
percentage  of current  revenues  greater  than
80 percent
In addition to controls of credit from the demand side, there have recently been controls of
credit by  suppliers. In Colombia, subnational debt started as debt to  private  commercial banks,
multilateral development banks, or domestic and foreign bond holders. Private commercial banks
are the most important creditors, and their regulation and supervision have become key channels for
restraining subnational borrowing. When the subnational entities were more or less outposts of the
national government, their debt was treated as fally secure by regulators, who did not require banks
to provision for nonperforming territorial debt, on the grounds that national government guarantees
ensured  eventual  compliance.  The  growing  independence  of  the  subnational  governments,
especially after 1991, converted this assumption into an important loophole in the budget constraint.
The  Superintendency  of  Banks  has  varied  its  requirement  that  banks  provision  against
nonperforming territorial loans, even when they are backed by guarantees.  Borrowing blossomed in
1993-94, prompting the Superintendency to classify any subnational loan with over a year maturity
as risky and to require some provisioning. This reduced credit supply sharply.  Regulations relaxed
again in  1996, leading to two years of high borrowing, and back to tighter  controls.  Starting in
1999, the debt of any territory with a red rating in the traffic-light system must be fully provisioned,
making such loans costly for the banks.  This combination may make the traffic-light law more
effective.
19Unlike in Argentina, the national government in Colombia does not automatically deduct debt
service  from  the  transfers  to  subnational  governments.  This  may  weaken  the  incentive  of
subnational governments to avoid excessive borrowing, but it should make lenders more cautious.
Either way, it should discourage excess borrowing.
Territorial governments also borrow, indirectly, from multilateral development banks through
FINDETER, a rediscounting facility that obtains its  resources largely from the  Inter-American
Development Bank and World Bank.  FINDETER uses these funds to rediscount loans made by
private banks to territorial governments, rediscounting from 50 to  100 percent of the original loan
amount. Since the originating banks take  100 percent  of the risk of default, FJNDETER's  only
direct risk is that the private banks will default. In 1997 FINDETER also became the conduit for
some of the funds lent under the national government's cofinancing program, which gave it a more
discretionary and political role.
The national governnent  has bailed out over-indebted departments. There were big, ad hoc
bailouts for Bogota in 1991 and for Medellin in the late 1990s for debt incurred to build the metro.
There has also been regular rescheduling of debt that financed electrification in the early 1980s.
Departments, then under the direct political control of the center, found that they could not service
the debt when a devaluation pushed up their fuel costs and the national government would not allow
corresponding increases  in  the electricity tariff.  In  the electrification cases, the  bailout  seems
justified, for the federal government was not giving departments the authority to  make necessary
adjustments to spending or taxes. There has been some conditionality,  with serious fiscal adjustment
requirements imposed for the rescheduling of department debt, so the incentives have been better
than  they  would  have  been  without  conditions.  There  have  been  no  federal  bailouts  for
municipalities.
Often  financing  from  the  central bank  is  what  loosens  the  budget  constraint  for  the
subnational governments, either directly by discounting subnational debt or indirectly by easing the
20national govermnent's budget constraint or allowing commercial banksto  roll over bad subnational
debts. In Argentina after  1991, making the central bank a  currency board hardened the budget
constraint for the national government and encouraged  it to  harden the constraint vis-a-vis the
subnational levels (Dillinger and Webb 1998). Supervision of commercial banks also tightened, and
the central bank was no longer a lender of last resort. Unsustainable deficits would be less likely
under condition 8, the central bank (and bank regulators) is more autonomous and has a strong
anti-inflation mandate.
Both of the traditional Colombian parties value macroeconomic stability and decentralization,
so the Congress and presidents have readily delegated substantial authority to technocrats, which
seems a common pattern where frequent but moderate political change is the norm and expectation
(Keefer  and  Staasavage  1998;  Cukierman  and  Webb  1995).  The  Central  Bank  and  the
Superintendency of Banks have strong capacity and de facto as well as legal independence. The
central bank has always been prohibited from lending to subnational governments, unlike Brazil or,
in the 1980s, Argentina. 9 In the 1972-89 period, Colombia had three changes of the central bank
president, two of which followed within six months of a change of government. This indicates more
independence than  most  Latin American countries in  the  same period, although less  than the
industrial countries or even most countries outside of Latin America (Cukierman and Webb 1995).
The Colombian Constitution of 1991 increased the bank's autonomy vis-a-vis the government, as in
several other Latin American countries, especially Argentina and Chile.
In sum, Colombia presents a mixed picture of borrowing constraints. The traffic-light law
potentially meets condition 5, but its terms are somewhat lax. There is no deduction from transfers
to force debt service, and there have been frequent bailouts in the past, violating condition 6. There
9  The 1991  constitution  forbids  the central  bank from lending  to the national  governrment  except  in a deep  crisis  and
with  the unanimous  approval  the bank's board,  which  has never happened.  Thus  the national  government  faces  a
hard-budget  constraint  its own  borrowing.
21is potentially a good mechanism for forcing creditors to take losses, meeting condition 7, but we
will see only in 1999 how well it is enforced. Independence of the central bank and of regulators
meets condition 8.
Intergovernmental  political relations
The rules for intergovernmental fiscal relations and the way in which they are implemented
result from the political relations between the levels. Why does the central government say yes or no
to  an SNG's  request for more resources? Why do the  SNGs take on additional tasks or accept
reduced transfers in order to help the central government balance its budget? In a situation with
substantial  transfers  from  the  national  government  to  politically  autonomous  subnational
governments, the ability of the national government to take a firm stance toward the SNGs depends
most  on the power of  the president  vis-a-vis the  governors and  mayors themselves and  their
representation in Congress.'  0 We would expect systems with strong presidencies to be better able to
fend off pressures to cover the states' deficits. The presidency is basically the only elected office
with a national constituency and as such would be more likely to take into account the interests of
the overall economy, while the members of Congress represent regional constituencies as well as
their parties.
We can analyze the power relationships between the national and subnational levels in four
steps, corresponding to four conditions. Unsustainable deficits arising from fiscal decentralization
would be less likely under condition 9, the president is constitutionally strong at the national level,
and under condition 10, governors have little constitutional autonomy. These conditions may not be
beneficial for all aspects of governance, and of course fiscal decentralization presumes that the
governors  have  enough  political  autonomy to  be  considered  a  politically  separate  level  of
22government, not just a field representative of central government. Governors and the president also
contend for resources indirectly, especially via Congress and the parties. So we must also consider
their effects on the intergovernmental balance of power. We would expect the central government  to
be able to maintain a harder budget constraint under condition 11, electoral rules orient Congress
toward  national issues, not  local ones, and under condition  12, party  discipline  is strong. The
balance between these forces depends on the interaction of the constitution, electoral procedures,
and  party  discipline. The constitution  is  a  given at  most times,  as  are  electoral  procedures.
Therefore, party discipline is the dependent outcome. But constitutions and electoral procedures
change  with some frequency in  Colombia  and the rest  of Latin  America, and  they reflect the
political balances and party characteristics at the time of each change.
President's constitutional authority. Colombia's president is directly elected by majority,
which, with a number of new parties in addition to the two traditional ones, generally requires a
runoff election. At the second stage of the election, the president allies himself with other parties to
get a majority, as in Brazil, and thus must bargain away some of his power and party cohesion even
before entering office. The president has a four-year term and cannot be re-elected, which reduces
his power even in his own party near the end of his term."  Presidents can propose legislation and
often do, but they have little power to  sustain a veto of what  Congress passes. If the president
objects to all or part of a proposed law that has been approved by both houses of Congress, the
proposed law returns to Congress for a second debate. Then if both (una y otra) chambers approve
it again by a simple majority, it becomes law, unless the objection is that the law is unconstitutional,
10 In the classic decentralized  fiscal system, local voters  are the taxpayers who pay the bill and therefore
exercise  restraint  on spending  (Tiebout  1956;  Weingast  1995).
The most  recent  Argentine  and Brazilian  constitutions  also forbade  reelection originally,  but the presidents
who stopped hyperinflation  (Menem and Cardoso) used their resultant popularity to push through amendments
permitting  re-election.  In Colombia,  the tradition  of alternating  between  Liberal  and Conservative  presidencies  makes
such an amendment  less likely. Also, there is no hyperinflation  to conquer;  stopping the civil war might  be the
Colombian  equivalent.
23in which case the constitutional court decides (Article 167). Thus under normallcircumstances the
president faces some limits to his power (Archer and Shugart 1997).
Although  the  constitution and  the  party  structure limit  the  president's  power  to  push
legislation through Congress, the president has considerable power to do things without them. The
president can declare a 90-day state of internal upheaval (conmocidn interior) with the approval of
all of his cabinet, although to extend the declaration up to 270 days, he needs the approval of the
Senate (Article 213). When there are (even) more serious disturbances or threats of disturbance to
the economic, social, and ecological order of the country, the president can declare a 30-day state of
emergency, with the approval of all the ministers, but not necessarily that of the Senate. There can
be  no more  than 90  days of state of  emergency in  one calendar year (Article  215). The two
provisions, if used to their maximum, would allow up to 360 days of executive rule by decree in a
given year, although the Senate would need  to  approve half of that.  Emergency powers were
frequently  used (and  abused) before the  1991 constitution, especially the  economic emergency
clause.  The new constitution strengthened the requirements for congressional approval, and since
then use has been rare.
In the economic sphere and elsewhere, Congress delegates wide discretion in implementation
and regulation to the executive branch or  special agencies, like the  Superintendency of Banks.
Thus, although the president's power to change policy in lasting a way still depends on his ability to
get Congress to enact legislation at least ex post to ratify his actions, condition 9 is met, especially
through emergency powers and delegation to agencies.
Gubernatorial and mayoralpower.  If subnational governments can run unsustainable deficits
or can refuse to cooperate in the national government's effort to control its deficits, then governors
and mayors have the power to oppose the national executive. Colombian governors and mayors
often have  relatively  strong democratic legitimacy, with  a  higher  voter turnout  rate  than  for
congressional elections and sometimes even higher than for presidential elections, although voter
24turnout is generally low at all levels of government (Colombia, Departamento de  Planificaci6n
1997). The elections for mayors and governors are held at different times and usually different years
than the national elections, a pattern that typically leads to more autonomy from national politics.
The law does not give mayors and governors much power, however. The 1991 constitution
says that "Colombia is a state social de derecho organized in the form of a unitary decentralized
republic, with autonomy of its territorial entities" (Article 1), but the states do not have their own
constitutions. The governors and mayors are constitutionally part of the executive branch of the
nation's government (Article 115). Thty have a duty to enforce national laws, as in Argentina. They
are elected for terms of only three years and cannot succeed themselves, unlike in Argentina and
Brazil, so they are lame ducks for even a greater fraction of their tenure than is the president.' 2
Although the 1991 constitution is too young for all of its implications to be evident, the terms seem
too  short to  encourage subnational governments to follow fiscal prudence or other policies with
long-term payoff.  The  posts of  mayor and  governor  are not  enduring positions  of  power  in
themselves, in contrast to the Congress, where deputies and senators can be re-elected. Clientelism
without major patrons (barons) has replaced the domination of the big electoral patrons in the pre-
1991 system (Buenahora 1997).
The starkest form of federal executive control over the states is the power to intervene, in
extreme cases  to  depose  an  elected  governor  and  legislature  and  replace them  with  federal
appointments. In Colombia, although the governors and mayors are no longer appointed from the
center, the  national government has at least as  much constitutional authority to intervene as in
Argentina, and much more than in Brazil.
12 A 1994  law (Article 131/1994)  made  mayors and governors  subject to recall by plebiscite  if they fail to
follow  the platform  on which they campaigned.  It remains  to be seen  whether  this law will play an active role in local
politics, but it would seem to be at least one more obstacle to the buildup of personal power.
25So, condition 10 is fulfilled in that the state executives are relatively weak, certainly weaker
than in Brazil and also weaker than in Argentina. The incentives in a potential center-subnational
confrontation differ greatly between  Colombia and Argentina,  however.  Whereas many of the
provincial governments in Argentina are well-established rivals to the center and command strong
local loyalty, Colombian subnational governments are former outposts of the center. Their nascent
independence is part of the national govermnent executive's  strategy to enhance the legitimacy of
formal  government in  the face of challenges from  guerrilla, para-military, and narco-traficante
groups. Although the center might have the power to overwhelm its creations, exercising that power
would undermine its own strategy. Intervention would also contravene the value of decentralization
from  a  congressman's  viewpoint, providing a way  to  move  some power to  execute  spending
programs out of the hands of the national executive and into the hands of locally elected offices that
would be part of a congressman's patronage machine.
Congressionalpower  as state representative. Congressional representation can also give state
governments the power  to  challenge  the  national executive.  Rules  governing the  election  of
congressional representatives  in  Colombia tend to  undermine  party  discipline and  reduce  the
likelihood that they  will  support  national, as  opposed  to  regional,  interests.  Under the  1991
constitution, representation in the Senate and  House of Deputies  is not organized according to
departments or municipalities, although informally they usually seek votes in limited geographic
areas that correspond to the subnational entities.
Congress is bicameral. The Senate has 100 members elected at-large with the country as a
single district plus two elected by indigenous comrnmunities.  Members of the House of Deputies are
elected by department (or  district in the case of the four municipalities with this  status). Each
department has a minimum of one deputy, plus one additional deputy for each 250,000 population.
Senators and representatives serve four-year terms. Both are elected by proportional representation,
26according  to  the  formula  of  the  highest  residual, which  encourages  small  parties  and  even
candidates from the same party to campaign on separate lists. At the extreme, the Liberal party has
put forth 134 lists (often with only one name) for 100 seats (Buenahora 1997).
In  contrast to  Argentina  and  Brazil,  these  terms give  low-population  areas  little  extra
representation per capita in the House  of Deputies and effectively under-represent them in  the
Senate. Because it is difficult for senatorial candidates to be known nationally (they only run once if
successful), they target voters in a limited geographic area or sometimes a particular interest group.
Efficient targeting focuses on high-density areas. In 1994, 12 of the 34 departments had no affiliated
senator. Bogota was the main source of votes for 25 senators, and another 22 came from Valle de
Cauca (Cali), Antioquia (Medellin), Atlantico, and Santander (Buenahora 1997, pp. 334-37). An
example  of special-interest senators  are those who were  elected by  focusing  on teachers  as a
constituency. They were important protectors of the arrangement by which the national govermment
negotiated wages and guaranteed the job  security of teachers, even after department and municipal
governments started paying the teachers. This electoral targeting was less successful in the  1998
election,  however,  opening some  political  scope  for  decentralization  of  personnel decisions
regarding teachers.
The electoral rules are set partly in the constitution but also in ordinary law and in the rules of
individual parties. The lack of party lists (versus local individual candidates) and the election of
subnational candidates at separate times (often different years) than the national executive tend to
weaken the influence of the national executive. Thus, condition 11 is not met in Colombia, because
most features of congressional elections orient attention to local interests, rather than national ones.
Party discipline. The Colombian party system, closely linked to the electoral rules for the
various levels and branches of government, weakens the power of the president and the political
attention paid to national issues. In general, a president as party leader has more power when parties
are disciplined, enabling him to  compel support from the members of his party despite costs to
27individual local  constituencies. The contrast of Argentina and Brazil  shows this  (Dillinger and
Webb 1998). Party concentration may also increase the power of the presidency by reducing the
need  to  build coalitions. Although  a  unified  opposition weakens  the  power  of  an  individual
president, having two coherent parties, each with a chance to occupy the presidency next time, can
facilitate agreements on matters of national interest that transcend party lines.
Two parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, have dominated Colombian politics for
more than a century. Affiliation with one or the other is virtually hereditary, at least for those who
associate with either (Buenahora 1997). The parties broke into open,  armed conflict in the late
nineteenth century and again in the 1950s. In 1958 they agreed to form an interim National Front,
rotating the presidency every four years. This agreement lapsed in 1968 with the promulgation of a
new constitution. In the competitive presidential elections since then, the party of the president has
switched in about half of the elections.
The venue  for armed political conflict, and  serious policy differences,  shifted to  leftist
guerrilla groups in the  1960s and  1970s and became increasingly complicated with the entry of
narco-traficantes  and  right-wing paramilitary groups in  subsequent  decades. Nongovermnental
military organizations continue to be a de facto part of the political system in the 1990s. They have
considerable influence even in departnents  like Valle and Antioquia, where the traditional parties
rule.
Although party affiliation is even more rigid in Colombia than in Argentina, this does not
lead to  strong  internal party discipline. The  automaticity of the  revenue-sharing  systems with
subnational  governments  reduces the  incentive  for  subnational politicians  to  assure  that  the
president is a member of their party. Under the  1991 constitution, the open-list system of electing
senators and congressmen, similar to the system in Brazil, gives no one leverage to exert party
discipline from the electoral side, but the lack of discretionary budget in the hands of governors,
unlike in Brazil or Argentina, also denies that avenue of party control.
28Now that  neither of the two major parties has national majority, the  two-stage election
procedure means that the president is effectively elected by a coalition, to whom he must promise
policies or favors. This seems to encourage the growth of special-interest parties that can then gain
concessions in exchange for support in the second round. The impossibility of re-election and the
inability of a president to name his successor, as he can in Mexico, weakens the president's ability
to discipline his own party. Successors are always openly organizing.
So condition  12 (party discipline) is not  met at all  in Colombia. Yet the  absence of two
political conditions does not make discipline in  intergovernmental fiscal relations impossible. It
does imply that such discipline would have to rely on the conditions that are present, namely the
power of the national executive to act through delegation of power and the constitutional weakness
of the subnational executives. As we saw earlier, this is indeed the case, so the political analysis
offers an explanation of the current emphasis on technocratic solutions and indicates the potential
danger if fiscal decentralization  problems were to escalate to the political level.
Table 3 sumnmarizes  the conditions laid out above. The absence of conditions 1, 4, 6, 1  1, and
12 are drawbacks,  especially 4  and 6. Condition 2 is problematic, as the narratives in the next
section show, because of the asymmetry in the transfer rules as well as the exceptional transfers.
The asymmetry is that national government shares almost all  of its revenue sources, so it has
difficulty raising revenue to maintain fiscal balance, but the departments get ad hoc transfers from
the Special Compensation Fund and from debt bailouts. Many conditions for fiscal prudence are
strongly present in Colombia, however, especially constraints on borrowing, and we shall see how
well they operate to sustain fiscal balance.
29Table 3. Summary of Conditions for Reduced Danger
of Excess Fiscal Deficits and Their Status in Colombia after 1991
Condition  Status in Colombia
I. Subnational  governments raise much of their own revenue  No
2. Transfers are specified by legal formula, not ad hoc  Yes, with important
exceptions
3.  National  govermnent  can  effectively delegate  functions  to  subnational  Yes
govemments  to go along with the delegation  of revenue  sources
4. Subnational  governments have authority to cut their costs  No
5. National government strictly controls subnational borrowing ex ante  Yes
6. National government credibly  commits not to have bailouts,  prohibiting  No
explicit bailouts and forcing subnational governments  to service their debt
7. Regulators force creditors to  accept the losses implied by any  failure to  Yes
service debt
8. The central bank and bank regulators are more autonomous and has a strong  Yes
anti-inflation mandate
9. The president is constitutionally strong at the national level  Yes
10. Governors  have little constitutional autonomy  Yes
1  1. Electoral  rules orient Congress toward national, not local, interests  No
12. Party discipline is strong  No
III. Fiscal Difficulties from Decentralization
To understand the effects of the features of the political system and of the system of fiscal
decentralization,  we need to look at the recent history. With decentralized government in the 1  990s,
Colombia has  had  to  contend  with  the  twin  problems  of  national  government deficits  and
subnational  deficits  that  threaten  to  become debt  problems  of  the  national government.  The
problems and the efforts to solve them are still evolving, so the story has not reached a conclusion,
but certain trends and the efficacy of some solutions are already evident. This section reviews the
history of the two main problem areas and evaluates the effects of the presence or absence of the
various conditions outlined above.
30Imbalances at the center
Since the late 1980s, fiscal decentralization has proceeded alongside the growth of  total
government spending and of deficits. There is some relationship between the three phenomena, but
most of the changes in the fiscal aggregates are independent of decentralization.' 3 See table 4. Total
government spending grew at the same pace as gross domestic product (GDP) in the late 1  980s and
then grew more rapidly during the 1990s, increasing from around 12 percent of GDP in 1987/90 to
almost 19 percent in 1997. Revenues, in contrast, only increased from  11 percent of GDP in 1987-
90 to almost 14 percent in 1997. The national government's primary spending (net of interest and of
transfers to the territorial governments and entities) has roughly doubled its share of GDP since the
late 1980s, from 5 to 10 percent. The national government increased its own expenditures for the
military, judges, and social security (to cover accrued liabilities not paid before).  There was no
reduction of national government outlays for administration, which should have occurred with the
transfer of functions to the subnational levels, and the deficit of the national government grew from
1 percent of GDP to almost 5 percent. National government interest expenses grew from 1 to 2
percent  of  GDP. Transfers to  territorial  governments and enterprises  expanded by  less than 2
percent of GDP, and this accounts for only a third of the growth in national government outlays.
At the subnational levels, spending and deficits of departmental governments increased only
0.1 or 0.2 percent of GDP in the 1990s; municipal spending increased 2.3 percent of GDP. The
municipal deficit rose by only 0.1 percent of GDP, but this would have been greater if the transfers
from the national level and tax revenues (mostly shared taxes) had not also risen by about 1 percent
of GDP each. Mostly the increase  in transfers to  subnational governments can be attributed to
national government's objective of increasing the coverage of social services, especially rural health
and education, and to salary increases negotiated by the national government. Although scheduled
31increases in the municipal transfers will require further national government outlays, it is clear that
the growth in the national government deficit in the 1990s was mainly due to its own spending, not
to higher transfers to territorial governments (see also Bird and Fiszbein 1998).
Table 4. Government  Fiscal Accounts at Three  Levels, 1987-97
(percentage of GDP)
Level ofgovernment  1987-90  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
National central government
Total revenue  10.9  12.1  12.7  13.5  15.2  13.2  13.5  13.9
Total spending  11.7  11.5  15.4  14.5  16.3  16.6  18.5  18.8
Primary spending'  5.1  4.8  6.4  7.0  8.3  8.5  10.1  10.5
Transfers to subnational governments  and  5.5  5.4  7.7  5.9  6.8  6.5  6.3  6.0
enterprises
Of which, current to subnational central  0.7  1.2  1.1  1.4  1.9  2.0
Administrations
Interest  1.0  1.2  1.3  1.5  1.2  1.6  2.1  2.3
Total surplus (deficit)b  -1.0  -0.7  -2.8  -1.3  0.6  -2.8  -4.9  -4.9
Primary balance  0.1  0.5  -1.5  0.3  1.7  -1.2  -2.8  -2.6
Domestic financing  1.4  0.8  3.6  0.5  -0.5  3.1
External financing  -0.4  -0.1  -0.8  0.7  0.0  -0.3
Departmental central administration
Total revenue  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.8  2.0
Total transfers to central administration  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.6
Own revenue  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4
Total spending  1.9  2.0  1.9  2.2  2.1  2.1
Primary spending'  1.8  1.8  1.8  2.1  1.9  1.9
Interest  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2
Total surplus (deficit)b  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.4  -0.3  -0.1
Primary balance  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  -0.3  -0.1  0.1
Domestic financing  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.3  0.1
Municipal central administration
Total revenue  2.2  2.6  3.0  3.4  3.9  4.4
Transfers (from national and departments)  0.9  1.2  1.5  1.8  1.8  2.1
Own revenue  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6  2.1  2.3
Total spending  2.3  2.9  3.0  3.7  4.4  4.6
Primary spendinga  2.2  2.7  2.8  3.5  4.1  4.2
Interest  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.4
Total surplus (deficit)b  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.3  -0.5  -0.2
Primnary  balance  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  -0.2  0.2
Domestic financing  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.5  0.2
a. Primary spending is net of interest and transfers to territories.
b. Balance after adjustment of transfers and inclusion of net lending.
Source: Central bank; Clavijo (1998); World Bank and International Monetary Fund staff estimates.
13 Fiscal data from  various sources all show the same broad trends described here, although they differ in
detail. The central bank's assemblage of data for 1987-95 is the best long-term series.
32The larger  of  the  transfer programs-the  situado fiscal,  which  goes to  departments-
represents expenditures that the national government would have made anyway for education and
health care. If the situado did not exist, the government would have made the expenditures directly.
Transfers to municipalities grew from less than 1 percent to more than 2 percent of GDP and
are slated to keep growing until 2002. For the most part,  they represent additional outlays, not
merely a rerouting of what the national government would be spending anyway. As  subnational
expenses rose, those  at the national level did  not  decline, even within the  area of  health  and
education, which was the main area of increase at the subnational levels. These additional expenses
are being met by additional revenues  or by cuts elsewhere.
The  1991 constitution  (Articles  360-361)  gave  all  mineral  royalties  (mostly  oil)  to
subnational governrments,  and these revenues have grown to almost 1 percent of GDP (Colombia,
Departamento Nacional de Planeaci6n 1998). Most of the royalties go to the departments where the
mineral originates and through which it is exported; the remainder go into a fund that is distributed
among all the territorial  governments. Although it  is  not usually  counted as  a  transfer in  the
statistics, the assignment of mineral revenues to territorial governments amounted to an important
step toward decentralization, but not a rational one in the opinion of most economists. They usually
recommend assigning such revenues to the national level (McLure 1994; McLure and Mieszkowski
1983). In Colombia, the transfer of this revenue source was not accompanied by any corresponding
transfer of spending responsibility, although the funds are loosely earmarked for investment. For the
few territories that get most of the money, it is a great bonus; but most of the territories get so little
from the Natural Resource Fund that it does not reduce their need for transfers from the center.
The transfers also complicated macro-fiscal management in more subtle ways. The (lower
bounds on the) monthly transfers to the territorial governments are based on the budgeted figures,
so within a given year they are a fixed charge, forcing all negative revenue shocks to be absorbed by
borrowing or spending cuts at the national level.
33Excessive subnational  borrowing
The  second macroeconomic  concern in  countries implementing decentralization is  that
elected mayors and governors will use their independence to  borrow beyond their jurisdictions'
capacity to repay. This raises the specter of defaults, followed by failures in the banking system and
pressures for national government bailouts.
In Colombia the total debt stock of departments and municipalities actually declined as a
share of GDP from 1991 to  1998, but several departments and municipalities nonetheless had debt
crises.  The decrease in total debt was all due to the amortization of external debt, much of which
was  due  to  multinationals  for  electrification projects  in  the  1  980s,  before  the  subnational
governments had political or fiscal autonomy. Domestic debt of the subnational governments grew
in the 1  990s, especially to the banking sector (Perry and Huertas. 1997). Although the data are not
complete, the debt to the domestic banking system increased from 2.6 percent of GDP in 1991 to
4.6 percent in 1997, according to estimates of the Superintendency of Banks.  1
4 See table 5. Of this
was debt, 30 percent was owed by territorial power companies to the National Electricity Fund
(FEN) and was backed by electricity tariffs. Excluding this power-sector debt, in 1991 territorial
bank debt totaled 1.8 percent of GDP; by 1997 it had increased to 3.2 percent. In addition to bank
debt, several of the larger municipalities have outstanding bonds. Total bond debt (as of August
1997) was estimated at $500 billion.
14 National  government  data imply  somewhat  lower  debt levels,  but following  the same  pattern. Subnational
debt levels in Colombia  compare favorably  with provincial  and state debt inl997 of 6 and 12 percent of GDP in
Argentina  and  Brazil,  respectively.
34Table  5. Stock  of Territorial  Governments'  Debt  to Banks,  1991-97
(billions of current pesos)
Level of government  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Departments
Direct administration  56  73  154  330  422  665  966
Electricity sector  15  25  193  177  480  513  864
Other enterprises  124  135  160  201  170  134  106
Municipalities
Direct administration  137  159  305  594  802  1,050  1574
Electricity sector  224  323  385  499  753  840  653
Other enterprises  142  183  187  257  336  556  757
Total  698  897  1,383  2,057  2,962  3,757  4,920
As a percentage of GDP  2.6  2.7  3.2  3.6  4.0  4.2  4.6
As a percentage of GDP,  1.8  1.6  1.8  2.4  2.4  2.7  3.2
excluding the electricity
sector
Source: Superintendencia  Bancaria.
The imbalances were not distributed equally, and some municipalities and departments were
in much worse shape than average. The subnational debt in Colombia has been problematic mainly
because the departments have little discretion over their receipts or spending, most of which has to
go for salaries. Neither the departments, the creditors, nor the Ministry of Finance took sufficient
account of this inflexibility in their ex ante evaluations of ability to pay.
Most territorial borrowing in Colombia is from private banks. See table 6. They typically
lend for short to medium terms, at variable rates of interest (pegged to the domestic cost of funds).
Banks normally require territorial govemments to  pledge specific revenue  sources as collateral.
Some territorial governments have pledged situado or municipal transfers for this purpose, although
of  questionable  legality, because  these  resources  are  earnarked.  The  increasing  discretion
(theoretically but not actually) in the use of situado resources and the increase in municipal transfers
are said to be partly responsible for the increase in territorial borrowing during the mid-i 990s. The
surges  of  borrowing  in  1993-94 and  in  1996-98 correspond to  periods  of  more  lax  banking
supervision with respect to subnational debt.
There are no departmental or municipal banks in Colombia, unlike in Brazil and Argentina.
Moreover, direct national government lending to subnational governrments is small (except for the
35quasi-public National Electric Fund). Govermnent-owned banks accounted for about one-quarter of
lending to  territorial  governments in  1997. Of  the  government  banks,  the  largest  lender  to
subnational was the Banco Popular, which was being privatized in the late 1990s. This situation has
important advantages. The absence of territorial banks helps to prevent territorial governments from
de-capitalizing the  banking system, and  the  small  extent  of  national government exposure  to
territorial debt reduces the pressure for politically motivated debt forgiveness.
Table 6. Major Lenders to Territorial Governments,  The  predominance  of  private
1997
(as  of December  31 in billions  of  pesos)  banks  in  lending  to  territorial
Loans to  Percentage
pobli  oftrcentale  governments meant  that  the  national public  of total
Lender  sectora  (excluding FEN)
P  govermment  was  not  heavily  exposed Public  sector  banks  2,697  25
Banco  Cafetero  346
Banco  Popularb  482  to  the threat  of  territorial  default,  in
Banco  del  Estado  162
Private  sector  banks  1,381  35  contrast to  Brazil.  Also,  territorial
Banco  Ganadero  539
Banco  de Colombia  420  borrowing has not  been large enough
Banco  de Bogota  281
Comercio  Antioquefto  141
Other  intermediaries  1,582  40  to cause a general  banking crisis that
Total  3,953
a. In  process  of privatization.  would  require  national  government
b. Includes  $604  billion  in national  government  debt  to
financial  intermediaries,  which could not be separated  due  intervention.  In 1997  the largest  lender
to data  constraints.
to territorial governments, the Banco Ganadero, had only about 20 percent of its portfolio in the
form of territorial debt, and this was broadly dispersed among many jurisdictions.
The  government nevertheless has been concerned about territorial  government debt and
attempted to  exert  some control over  it,  as  mentioned earlier. On  the  credit-supply  side,  the
Superintendency of  Banks  imposed  tight  regulations  in  1995, which  slowed  the  growth  of
subnational debt in real terms (except to the electricity sector).  This helped pressure subnational
governments  to  accept the  traffic-light  law,  which  would  require  banks  to  provision  against
nonperforming territorial loans, even when they were backed by guarantees.  In 1997, the first year
36of transition to  the new regime, subnational deficits increased somewhat, and in 1998 local debt
crises began to test the new system.
The economic slowdown in  the late  1990s slowed or  reversed the  real  growth  of tax
revenues and transfers,  and tight credit conditions pushed up  interest costs, with the result that
several large and medium-size departments found themselves unable to pay their debt obligations.
In mid-1998 the departments  of Valle de  Cauca (around  Cali)  and Santander Norte  were not
servicing their debt and needed to reschedule with their banks and to agree to a fiscal adjustment
program that would assure servicing of the rescheduled debt. Antioquia (Medellin) and Atlantico
(Baranquilla) were expected to need rescheduling in 1999 and were waiting to see the outcome in
Valle.  In the late 1990s, Cuindamarca and the federal district of Bogota are the only major entities
with clear creditworthiness, since the federal bailout for Bogota in 1991 for the purchase of buses.
Most of  the  smaller  municipalities  and even  small-population  departments have  not  had  the
autonomy to get themselves into much debt trouble.
The resolution in Valle may set precedents, so the example has general interest.  If such an
agreement were not reached, the banking regulations would require 100 percent provisioning, which
provided the banks with strong incentives to reach a deal. For at least two of the largest bank groups
with  loans  to  the  subnational  governments-Santander  Bank  (Spanish) and  Sarmiento  Group
(Colombian)-this  would  have severely hurt their  annual  profit positions  but  would  not  have
bankrupted them. For the departments, the incentive to  settle was to assure continued access to
short-term credit and eventually restore access to net new medium-term lending. Santander Bank
led the negotiations with the department of Valle, and the agreement emerging in late 1998 received
little financial help from the national govemment, or direct involvement by the Ministry of Finance,
and  reflected  mainly  conmmercial  banking  interests.  The  banks  would  offer  concessions  by
rescheduling and forgiving some of the debt, in exchange for prepayment of some debt with the
proceeds from privatization. The department had to increase its tax effort somewhat but did not
37have to  reduce expenditures significantly, because that would require laying off workers.' 5 The
department would  get  a  nominal  green light  in  its  debt rating,  allowing the  banks  to  avoid
provisioning, but any future borrowing would be subject to approval by the consortium of banks. In
effect it was the first syndicated loan in Colombia's domestic market.1 6 It represented a market
solution to the subnational debt problem, which was clearly motivated by national governrment
regulation but was not dictated in detail.
Did decentralization produce an unsustainable level of territorial debt? Not in the aggregate.
But  the  new  rules  that  make  private  banks  bear much  of  the  risk  of  lending to  territorial
governments are not a cause for complaisance. With elections to win, governors and mayors have a
strong incentive to run up large personnel bills along with  big  debts. Although recent banking
regulations make lending to territorial govermnents less attractive to banks, evidence from Brazil
and Argentina suggests that banks will continue to lend to questionable borrowers if they believe
that the national government can be persuaded to bail them  out  eventually. This has happened
before, in Bogota in the early 1990s and more recently in Medellin with the debt for the metro, and
some govemors might count on a repeat scenario. Whether territorial debt can be contained will
therefore depend on the national government's resistance to such pressures.
IV. Conclusions
The processes of political and fiscal decentralization have proceeded quickly in Colombia.
Consequently, large amounts of  money and  other important decisions are being handled with
institutional arrangements that are relatively untested and lack strong reputations. Of course, there
are some strong institutions at the national level, such as the Superintendency of Banks, the Central
15 The legally  required  exit packages  for workers  would  have  been expensive,  averaging  more  than a year of
salary,  and  the payoff  to this investment  was  too long  to be financially  attractive  at prevailing  interest  rates.
38Bank, and the Ministry of Finance-meeting  condition 8-and  the extent to which they have been
brought into the process is significant.
The fiscal problems of  the national government in the  1990s mostly originated on  the
spending  side  for items not  related to  decentralization. The requirement  to  share virtually all
revenues with the subnational governments meant that the national government could not balance
the budget just by raising taxes, as Brazil and Argentina did. The continued increase in transfers to
the municipalities, mandated by the 1991 constitution, exacerbated the problems of the center. This
is the manifestation of the asymmetry of condition 2 in Colombia, in which formulas for transfers
comrnit the national government more than they restrain the demands of subnational governments.
The national government responded in different ways to  the two waves of subnational debt
crises, showing a positive learning process.  Both times the departments and cities had to take fiscal
adjustment measures,  but first time the national government financed most of the relief.  The second
time, the initial settlement (in Valle) suggests a pattern where the department and its creditors bear
the cost of settlement - the political cost of adjustment for the governor and the financial cost of
debt relief for the banker.  Fiscal problems of the subnational territorial governments have arisen
because most of them have such meager discretionary revenue that they could divert to debt service.
The departments, although they appear to have a lot of resources with the situado fiscal, actually
have few discretionary resources with which to service debt, because so much of their spending is
tied to educational personnel whose number and salaries are not under their control-the  absence of
condition 4. Resources they borrow offer some discretion, but of course only temporarily, at the
cost of less discretion later.
The  lack  of  fiscal  autonomy  commensurate  with  their  democratic  mandate  puts  the
departments in an awkward political position and reduces their incentive to raise revenue or control
16 Conversations with Pedro Nel Ospina, July and November 1998.
39costs in  the  few areas where they have  some autonomy.  Although municipalities have more
spending authority than departments,  they too are bound by number of mandates and matching fund
arrangements with the national government.
In  order  to  control  subnational indebtedness, the national government  is  now  working
through both the borrowing-demand and the credit-supply channels-meeting  conditions 5 and 7.
Although the traffic-light system of regulating subnational borrowing has technical flaws, regarding
the definition of saving, it has the potential to work better than the more complex system in Brazil,
because Colombia's national government has more control over local governments, at least the ones
with large economies and populations, which could threaten the economic system if there were a
collapse. But this  alone probably would not be  enough, for the incentives would  still exist for
territories and  creditors to collude in  over-lending, with expectations of  a national  government
bailout.'7
To address the incentives, the creditors need to face potential loss, even before a general
fiscal collapse, and the threat of having to provision against loans to territories with a red or yellow
rating meets condition 7. Also, the relation of fiscal adjustment and access to credit seems to be
made appropriately explicit by the new requirement that banks negotiate the terms of the workout
with the territorial  governments. It  remains to  be  seen how  well this  actually  works, as  it is
scheduled to be enforced in 1999.
Having  the  subnational  governments  face  the  risk  of  being  forced  into  harsh  fiscal
adjustmnent  if they over-spend would seem to instill the right incentives for prudent borrowing, but
the political weakness of local governments in the face of guerrilla and paramilitary groups limits
the credibility of such threats by the national government. The impossibility for govemors and
17 The governor  or mayor  with  only  the chance  of one term  might  want  to over-borrow  even  without  the
expectation of a bailout, but the creditor would not agree unless he thought he would get the money back from someone.
40mayors to have second terms also reduces their incentive for fiscal prudence. So this constraint
would not have as much effect as in Argentina. Thus, neither the supply-side nor the demand-side
constraints on  subnational  borrowing  appear  adequate  by  themselves,  and  so  the  national
government  is using both.
The problems in managing fiscal decentralization in Colombia arose out of certain political
decisions, and their resolution would require others. The constitutional convention of 1991, which
made some key decisions for decentralization, was dominated by nontraditional parties that did not
have access to power at the national level; even under the new constitution, they still have much
less influence at the national than at the local level. It is not surprising, therefore, that they would
write a constitution mandating automatic transfer of substantial resources to local levels. Congress
has substantial leeway to amend the constitution, so the preservation of fiscal decentralization has
required at least the tacit support of most Liberals and Conservatives in the Congress. For those
incumbents, decentralization is also beneficial, as it gives more resources to the local governments
and thus to patronage machines that are also linked to the congressmen.
Before the Constitution of 1991, the Congress had delegated a lot of power and authority to
the executive, because of its own inability to act decisively (Archer and Shugart 1997). The 1991
constitution effectively  transfers  some  of  that  delegation  to  the  municipalities.  It  leaves  the
executive with extensive power to construct policy, with only the ex post approval of Congress, but
the decentralization took  control of the execution of a  lot of spending away from  the national
executive and gave it to territorial governments. It is not clear whether this division of power, with
the potential for a system of checks and balances, has put accountability and authority together in
the right places.
Since most transfers go to the subnational entities automatically and the discretionary funding
is distributed case-by-case, not  on purely party lines, congressmen in Colombia have a weaker
41incentive than in Argentina to put someone from their own party in the presidency. The president
does not have much extra to offer loyal party members. Consequently, Colombia's president, unlike
Argentina's, does not command  much intrinsic party loyalty; he has to  buy it each time,  like in
Brazil. Indeed there seems to  be  a vicious circle, with lack of party discipline leading to more
personal patronage, which then makes it less advantageous and perhaps even disadvantageous for a
legislator to vote the party line without question or compensation (Buenahora 1997; Archer and
Shugart  1997). This  suggests  that  in  order  to  bolster  the  national  executive,  internal  party
discipline-strong  in Argentina, but weak in Brazil and Colombia-is  more important than stable
party affiliation, which is as strong in Colombia as in  Argentina. Those elected with the current
system will have incentives to  preserve it, of course, at least as long as a  challenge from forces
outside the system-an  economic or political crisis-is  not perceived to threaten their survival.
Some groups are still under-represented or left out of the official system at the national level,
such as the nontraditional parties, or at all levels, such as the guerrilla groups. They might have an
interest in bargaining their participation in exchange for structural reforms of the political system.
Despite weak party discipline and the orientation of congressional politics to local patronage,
the national government traditionally has maintained macroeconomic stability by delegating policy
decisions to competent ministries and agencies. But this strategy has run into difficulties as more
fiscal policy is delegated to the territorial  governments. For decentralization to be  real, central
agencies have to relinquish control in at least some substantive areas. The challenge is to choose the
areas in which to maintain control without stifling the nascent subnational democracies.
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